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“Zoned for Residential Uses”—Like Prayer?  
Home Worship and Municipal Opposition  
in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In seventeenth-century Europe, small clusters of believers gath-
ered in their homes to worship according to their minority faith. 
When persecution drove them from those homes, these Pilgrims 
sought the freedom to pray in America. Today, a cluster of Ortho-
dox Jews in southern New York state, led by Rabbi Yitzchok 
LeBlanc-Sternberg, are battling for the right to worship in their 
homes against hostile neighbors who have attempted to drive them 
out through zoning restrictions on their religion. This Note will ex-
amine the contours of this decade-long legal controversy in New 
York and its impact on Free Exercise jurisprudence in the land use 
context. 
Despite the abundance of scholarship on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause, how Free Exercise claims 
actually fare in lower courts has received scant attention.2 By assess-
ing the lifecycle of this case, this Note examines how Free Exercise 
principles play out in resolving a religious land use dispute. Part II 
provides background on modern Free Exercise jurisprudence and 
particularly its clash with land use regulation, including restrictions 
on home worship. Part III describes the facts and reasoning of the 
Second Circuit’s three rulings in the LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher 
 
 1. This controversy reached the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
three times, each time entitled LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher. See 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995); 
No. 96-6149, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31,800 at *6. (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 1996); 143 F.3d 748 (2d 
Cir. 1998). 
  The author wishes to thank Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr. for his mentorship and 
his inspiring dedication to the cause of religious liberty; Dean Kevin Worthen and Professor 
Frederick M. Gedicks for their thoughtful feedback and valuable perspectives; and Hannah 
Clayson Smith for illuminating my life and the law as my wife, classmate, and chief co-counsel.  
The author bears full and sole responsibility for any errors in this Note. 
 2. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An 
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1408 (1992). 
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controversy. Part IV assesses the court’s holdings, analyzes their im-
pact, and recommends improvements for protecting Free Exercise 
rights in zoning disputes. Part V concludes that the Fletcher prece-
dents, particularly their narrowing of governmental discretion in 
zoning, modestly and properly raise the level of legal protection for 
religious exercise. 
II. BACKGROUND ON ZONING AND RELIGION 
The First Amendment’s religion clauses champion two of our na-
tion’s treasured principles. This case concerns the Free Exercise 
Clause: “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exer-
cise [of religion].”3 What the Constitution leaves unsaid frames the 
debate on religious land use: (1) what scope of Free Exercise does 
the Constitution mandate, and (2) how does a court balance a reli-
gious congregation’s liberty and property rights against the larger 
community’s interests? Religious land use jurisprudence has long 
sought to appropriately weigh these fundamental values of our Con-
stitution and our people. 
A. Modern Judicial Approach to Free Exercise 
In 1963, the Supreme Court set the standard for modern Free 
Exercise jurisprudence in Sherbert v. Verner.4 The Court in Sherbert 
created a test to balance state action against its burden on religious 
exercise. In essence, state action was constitutional only if it survived 
strict scrutiny—that is, if it both advanced a compelling state interest 
and employed the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. 
This standard placed a heavy burden of proof upon a governmental 
actor to justify the burdens its actions placed on religious exercise. 
But in 1990, the landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith5 
abandoned that standard in dramatic fashion. 
 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 4. See 374 U.S. 398 (1963). This case involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired 
because she would not work on Saturday, her faith’s day of rest. When she applied for state 
unemployment benefits, she was disqualified for the same reason. The Court found that no 
compelling state interest justified a denial of benefits for her religious observance. 
 5. 494 U.S. 872 (1989), reh’g denied, 496 U.S. 913 (1990). As in Sherbert, at issue 
was the denial of unemployment benefits. The two plaintiffs, as part of the religious ceremony 
of the Native American Church, ingested a narcotic (peyote) that violated the state’s drug laws, 
causing them to be fired for misconduct and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation. 
The Court upheld the denial of benefits. 
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In Smith, the Court lowered the standard to a very permissive 
and deferential one, akin to mere rational basis review.6 According to 
Smith, any valid neutral law of general applicability need not be justi-
fied even if it burdens religious exercise. The Court downplayed its 
prior strict-scrutiny rulings as falling within a hybrid rights exception. 
If some other First Amendment right was implicated along with the 
Free Exercise claim, then the strict-scrutiny standard would still ap-
ply.7 In sum, Smith seemed to sweep away the special protection re-
ligion had enjoyed. 
In 1993, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah,8 the Supreme Court articulated an important limitation on 
the Smith doctrine by elaborating on what constituted a neutral law 
of general applicability. The Court invalidated a city ordinance bur-
dening religious exercise, even though it was neutral and generally 
applicable on its face. Without disturbing Smith’s holding that inci-
dental burdens on religion need not be justified, the Court reasoned 
that the “Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostil-
ity which is masked as well as overt.”9 While the ordinance seemed 
neutral on its face, the majority zeroed in on the ordinance’s in-
tended effects. The record revealed a clear discriminatory purpose—
to suppress an unpopular religious practice of a certain minority 
church.10 Thus, “facial neutrality alone was not sufficient to escape 
rigorous scrutiny.”11 Three concurring justices urged re-examination 
or rejection of Smith as a serious misreading of the Constitution.12 
This examination of legislative purpose may significantly narrow the 
scope of what constitutes a neutral law. 
The alarmed proponents of religious liberty have struggled since 
Smith to overturn its apparent demotion of religion as undeserving 
 
 6. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876. 
 7. See id. at 881. 
 8. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 9. Id. at 534. 
 10. The city ordinance ostensibly regulated the ritual killing of animals. But with 
exemptions for Kosher slaughter, the record clearly established a single target: banning the 
ceremonial animal sacrifices of the Santeria religion, whose theology fuses Catholicism and 
African tradition. 
 11. Kenneth Pearlman & Stuart Meck, Land Use Controls and RFRA: Analysis and Pre-
dictions, 2 NEXUS J. OPINION 127, 129 (1997). 
 12. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 578 (Blackmun & 
O’Connor, JJ., concurring). 
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of special protection under the Constitution.13 Their efforts so far 
have been largely frustrated.14 By 1993, “a remarkable groundswell 
of opposition [to Smith] from religious and civil liberties groups 
across the political spectrum”15 successfully urged Congress to enact 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) by sizeable mar-
gins.16 The Act attempted to turn back the clock legislatively: it over-
turned Smith and restored the Sherbert test to Free Exercise jurispru-
dence.17 RFRA declared the following test for Free Exercise claims: 
(1) Does the state regulation substantially burden religious practice? 
(2) Does the regulation advance a compelling state interest? (3) Is 
the regulation the least restrictive means of advancing that compel-
ling interest?18 In effect, any state regulation that “substantially bur-
dened” religious exercise would be invalid, unless a compelling gov-
ernmental interest justified the burden and the regulation was the 
least restrictive means of achieving that goal. 
However, at its first opportunity, the Supreme Court struck 
down RFRA as unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores19 in 1997. 
In this one case converged “two of the most important and con-
tested issues of modern constitutional law[:]” the scope of Free Ex-
ercise, and “the relationship between congressional and judicial au-
thority in interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights.”20 The 
facts of Boerne centered on religious land use regulation, but the ma-
jority never reached that issue.21 Instead of providing “guidance on 
religion and land use, the Court treated the case as ‘Marbury v. 
Madison: The Sequel,’”22 focusing on whether Congress had the 
constitutional authority to enact RFRA. The Court ruled that Con-
gress did not. By seeking to define the scope of Free Exercise, it had 
 
 13. See infra notes 15-18, 27-30 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
 15. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 159 (1997). 
 16. See id. at 160. 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1999). 
 18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1999). 
 19. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 20. McConnell, supra note 15, at 153. 
 21. In Boerne, a growing Catholic congregation wished to renovate all but the facade of 
its officially landmarked, historic structure. The church claimed exemption under RFRA from 
the city’s preservation ordinance, which prohibited the proposed renovation. See Boerne, 521 
U.S. at 511. 
 22. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 131. 
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exceeded its power under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforce-
ment Clause.23 The majority struck down RFRA’s standard of judi-
cial strict-scrutiny review of state and local governmental practices.24 
But Boerne contained a caveat critical to religious land use: Congress 
does have authority to legislate remedies (to protect religious exer-
cise) if it has “reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the 
congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being un-
constitutional.”25 For reasons discussed below, zoning laws, like 
those at issue in Fletcher, may qualify as precisely such a category of 
laws, thereby justifying congressional regulation.26 
RFRA’s advocates, humbled by Boerne, have since regrouped be-
hind a more narrowly tailored alternative: the proposed Religious 
Liberty Protection Act (“RLPA”), which is still before Congress.27 
The RLPA bill rectifies RFRA’s exposed weaknesses by invoking 
firmer grounds for its authority.28 It is backed by findings, including 
“a massive record of individualized assessment of land use plans, of 
discrimination against churches as compared to secular places of as-
sembly, and of discrimination against small and unfamiliar denomi-
nations as compared to larger and more familiar ones.”29 According 
to the caveat in Boerne, this record of actual discrimination improves 
 
 23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 24. See Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in Wake of City of Boerne v. Flo-
res: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local In-
fringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 633 (1998). The opinion did not explicitly 
invalidate “RFRA insofar as it applies to federal laws and practices.” See id. at n.5. But because 
state and local—not federal—regulations predominate in Free Exercise cases, and especially in 
the land use context, this possibly surviving remnant of RFRA is not very significant and be-
yond the scope of this Note. 
 25. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 26. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.C.1. 
 27. See H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 28. RLPA derives its authority from the Commerce and Spending Clauses, not the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. See H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1998). 
According to one scholar, RLPA’s invocation of the Spending Clause “is an utterly routine 
exercise of authority under the Spending Power,” and the Commerce Power is also appropriate 
as “our Constitution’s means of demarcating the federal from the state spheres of regulation.” 
Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearings on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, June 23, 1998 (statement of Michael McConnell, Professor, University of Utah Law 
School), available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File [hereinafter McConnell Statement]. 
 29. Legislation to Protect Religious Liberty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, Sept. 9, 1999 (statement of Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of Texas Law 
School) available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File [hereinafter Laycock 1999 Senate 
Statement]. 
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the likelihood that RLPA would be found constitutional. Lastly, 
RLPA “is not subject to the separation of powers objections that ul-
timately doomed RFRA.”30 
B. Land Use Regulation and Free Exercise 
The interests of land use regulation and religious exercise clash in 
what is still an open-ended debate in the courts. Traditionally a local 
issue, zoning disputes began to spill over into federal courts after the 
Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.31 ruled that 
zoning ordinances are constitutional unless they are “clearly arbitrary 
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare.”32 When deciding if zoning ordi-
nances burden religious exercise, lower courts have diverged in their 
decisions, in part because “unlike other aspects of the First Amend-
ment where the federal courts have given substantial guidance, deci-
sions on religion and land use have more often come at the state 
level and state practice varies widely.”33 To date, the Supreme Court 
has never provided direct guidance on how to evaluate Free Exercise 
claims—including those stemming from home worship—in the land 
use context.34 
The extent to which the Smith doctrine applies to land use regu-
lation is unclear.35 Because it only applies to neutral rules of general 
applicability, it may not even reach land use laws. The key determina-
tion (not yet resolved by the courts) is whether zoning laws impact-
ing religious institutions are “of general applicability or involve par-
ticularized determinations for a single site.”36 If generally applicable, 
then the Smith doctrine will most likely apply. But strong evidence 
suggests that zoning decisions are particularized determinations. 
Zoning ordinances are fraught “with exemptions and discretionary 
 
 30. McConnell Statement, supra note 28. RLPA avoids confrontation by accepting the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. It merely adds federal statutory 
protection for religion, just as certain environmental and disability laws are promoted to the 
maximum constitutional extent of federal power, but are not themselves constitutional rights. 
 31. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 32. Id. at 395 (citation omitted). 
 33. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 128. 
 34. See Ann Wehener, When a House Is Not a Home but a Church: A Proposal for Protec-
tion of Home Worship from Zoning Ordinances, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 491, 493 (1993). 
 35. See McConnell, supra note 15, at 167 (enumerating situations in which Smith does 
not apply and strict scrutiny for Free Exercise claims does). 
 36. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 134. 
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mechanisms” that lead to “highly individualized solutions to land 
use issues.”37 Though most zoning ordinances are enacted by legisla-
tive bodies (i.e., a city council), “many consider these actions to be 
administrative in nature” because (unelected) planning commissions 
so profoundly shape these ordinances.38 For example, zoning bodies 
have discretion to place conditions on permits, to retain on-going 
review, and to grant exemptions and variances.39 Because “[l]and use 
regulation is among the most individualized and least generally ap-
plicable bodies of law in our legal system,”40 it is vulnerable to argu-
ments that zoning decisions challenged by Free Exercise claims 
should receive strict judicial scrutiny. 
A majority of courts recognize that places of worship enjoy a 
special status, but “none has gone so far as to claim all zoning ordi-
nances that affect churches are impermissible.”41 In these jurisdic-
tions, “churches are presumed to contribute to the general welfare 
and morals of the surrounding community” and offer “an inherently 
beneficial quality” that presumptively or conclusively weighs in their 
favor.42 New York has a history of affirmative protection of religious 
liberty, robustly interpreting the scope of Free Exercise.43 Similarly, 
Indiana, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, and Washington have given 
special consideration to religious interests in zoning disputes.44 
By contrast, a minority of states “are highly deferential to mu-
nicipal decisions”45 that inhibit places of worship, as long as the or-
 
 37. ANGELA C. CARMELLA, Land Use Regulation of Churches, in THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN CHURCHES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF LEGAL STRUCTURES ON 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Craig Mousin ed., forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 11, on file with 
author). 
 38. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 134. 
 39. See CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 11. 
 40. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
755, 767 (1999). 
 41. Wehener, supra note 34, at 495. 
 42. Angela C. Carmella, Liberty and Equality: Paradigms for the Protection of Religious 
Property Use, 37 J. CHURCH & ST. 573, 592 (1995). 
 43. See Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 239 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 1968); Jewish 
Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 342 N.E.2d 534 (N.Y. 1975).  
 44. See Milharcic v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 489 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1986); Beit Havurah v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 418 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1979); Lubavitch Chabad 
House v. City of Evanston, 445 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 
(1983); Libis v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 292 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972); City of Sum-
ner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 639 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1982).  
 45. Carmella, supra note 42, at 593. 
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dinances bear “substantial relation to promoting the public health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare.”46 California and Florida, for ex-
ample, defer to municipal bodies that exclude churches if an alterna-
tive location exists.47 “[T]hese courts seldom [uphold] a free exercise 
challenge, reasoning that economic burdens on religious freedom do 
not rise to a constitutionally impermissible infringement.”48 They do 
not perceive the building of a church “as a fundamental tenet of a 
congregation’s beliefs” and thus a denial does not constitute a “sub-
stantial” burden.49 
C. Land Use Regulation and Home Worship 
As a subset of religious land use issues, home worship raises all 
the important questions in a context closer to home.50 One might 
suppose that home worship, because of its inherently private location 
and nature, would remain safely impervious to the tentacles of zon-
ing regulations. According to one court, “Nothing can be more 
deeply personal than [a person’s] desire to worship in the manner at 
issue here. He is at home. He is in prayer. He is with friends. He is 
entitled to be left alone.”51 However, courts differ in their view of 
the proper level of protection for individuals who gather in homes 
for religious purposes. One tendency emerges: “the larger and more 
public the assembly . . . , the more vulnerable the activity is to mu-
nicipal restriction.”52 
Only three home worship cases have elicited rulings from federal 
courts of appeals.53 In Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San 
 
 46. Wehener, supra note 34, at 495-96. 
 47. See CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 18. 
 48. Wehener, supra note 34, at 496. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) 
(causing religious observance to become economically disadvantageous did not impermissibly 
burden Free Exercise). 
 49. Wehener, supra note 34, at 496. 
 50. In this Note, “home worship” refers only to collective religious exercise in a resi-
dence by a group that includes non-residents. Though beyond the scope of this Note, home 
worship by residents also raises interesting legal issues. Who is a “resident” and how do zoning 
officials define household composition and family? While “[m]ost codes accommodate reli-
gious persons who seek to live together in a residence but who are not a ‘family,’” e.g., nuns in 
a convent, “many living arrangements do not meet these specially defined uses, and the ques-
tion continues to be litigated.” Carmella, supra note 42, at 589 n.39. 
 51. State v. Cameron, 498 A.2d 1217, 1228 (N.J. 1985). 
 52. Carmella, supra note 42, at 589. 
 53. Another home worship case, decided on the grounds of vagueness and thus never 
reaching the Free Exercise claim, is Nichols v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of 
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Francisco,54 the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of a conditional use 
permit for a church that wished to move its worship meetings into a 
residential home. The congregation had been meeting in a rented 
hotel banquet room. Short of claiming a religious “need” to relo-
cate, the church explained why worshipping in a home was impor-
tant to them. It was motivated by both doctrine (the Second Com-
ing’s imminence obviated the building of nonresidential structures) 
and practical considerations (independence from commercial estab-
lishments saves money and enhances flexibility).55 The court declined 
to invalidate the city’s permit denial. It reasoned that the denial did 
not restrict any current exercise of religion, and restricting only a de-
sired future change in that exercise was not a sufficiently substantial 
burden.56 
In Grosz v. City of Miami Beach,57 the Eleventh Circuit similarly 
upheld a city ordinance that enjoined Rabbi Armin Grosz from con-
ducting prayers with fellow Orthodox Jews in his garage in Miami. 
The tenets of Orthodox Judaism require a quorum (“minyan”) in 
order to conduct worship services. This sets Orthodox Jews apart as 
a particularly sympathetic subset of home-worshipping plaintiffs: 
their doctrine compels the gathering of a certain minimum of mem-
bers.58 Nevertheless, the court found that that the city’s zoning in-
terests outweighed the burden on the congregants’ Free Exercise in-
terest.59 It reasoned that the availability of a Jewish temple nearby 
made this burden on religion permissible, despite the congregants’ 
belief that worship in this rabbi’s home was more effective.60 
RFRA reversed Rabbi Grosz’s fortunes.61 In 1996, the Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned that, while its first ruling found the governmental 
interest did outweigh the burden on religion, RFRA now mandated 
 
Stratford, 667 F. Supp. 72 (D. Conn. 1987). 
 54. 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1991). 
 55. See id. at 1224. 
 56. See id. 
 57. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984). 
 58. This requirement for a quorum (or “minyan”) comes from the Jewish Talmud (a 
sacred code of religious practice) and figures prominently in this Note’s lead case, as discussed 
below. A minyan consists of at least ten observant males age thirteen or older. 
 59. See Grosz, 721 F.2d at 741. 
 60. See id. at 739. Rabbi Grosz defied the court’s order to cease his prayers, finding the 
court no more persuasive than the Nazi persecution he had survived. 
 61. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 82 F.3d 1005 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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a different inquiry: did the ordinance substantially burden religion?62 
The court ruled that it did, thus triggering strict scrutiny and invali-
dation of the ordinance. Since RFRA’s demise, this controversy’s 
resolution is again uncertain. 
To summarize, Free Exercise claimants must first demonstrate 
that the challenged state action imposes “a substantial burden on re-
ligious exercise,” but this initial showing “has historically been a 
problem for home worshippers.”63 Courts handling suits brought by 
advocates of home worship “have focused on whether the effect on 
religion is incidental or substantial.”64 Because “[e]conomic hardship 
has not sufficed as a substantial burden” and alternative locations are 
usually (at least theoretically) available, courts seem “reluctant to 
find burdens on religion when home worship is involved.”65 Never-
theless, in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher,66 the third home worship 
case to reach a federal court of appeals, the court reached a dramati-
cally different conclusion. 
III. THE LEBLANC-STERNBERG V. FLETCHER CONTROVERSY 
The legal struggle between the Orthodox Jews and certain resi-
dents of Ramapo, New York, spans a decade.67 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals has issued three rulings (Fletcher I, II, and III) on 
different aspects of the case, most recently in May 1998.68 All three 
have favored the religious liberty interests of the Jewish plaintiffs. 
The remainder of this Note will summarize the Second Circuit’s 
 
 62. Id. at 1007. 
 63. Wehener, supra note 34, at 506. Thus, even the liberty-oriented RFRA regime pro-
vided only limited assistance to home worship claims. RFRA supported free exercise claims by 
requiring a compelling governmental interest to outweigh the substantial burden. Home wor-
shippers struggle to establish the burden itself as substantial. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights 
Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 946 
(1989) (exploring the distinction between permissible and impermissible burdens). 
 64. Wehener, supra note 34, at 497. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens 
on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175 (1996) (arguing that even incidental bur-
dens on rights should be subject to some form of heightened scrutiny). 
 65. Wehener, supra note 34, at 502. 
 66. 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 67. The plaintiffs filed their original complaint in 1991, which matured into LeBlanc-
Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 68. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Fletcher 
I]; LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, No. 96-6149, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31800, at *6. (2d 
Cir. Dec. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Fletcher II]; LeBlanc-Strenberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748 (2d 
Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Fletcher III]. 
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three rulings and assess their aggregate impact on Free Exercise and 
home worship in land use disputes. 
A. Round One: Free Exercise Rights Vindicated 
1. The facts 
The Town of Ramapo, New York, is a large area that embraces 
both incorporated villages and unincorporated sections.69 A signifi-
cant influx of Orthodox Jewry, including members of its Hasidic 
subgroup, settled in the unincorporated Airmont section of Ramapo 
during the 1980s. 
a. Religious needs of the new Orthodox neighbors. The strict reli-
gious observance of Orthodox Jews mandates certain conditions for 
worship services. Central religious practices, such as reciting certain 
prayers and reading from the Torah, require a quorum (“minyan”) 
of at least ten men over the age of thirteen. Observing the familiar 
commandment to “rest” on the Sabbath, Jewish law forbids the use 
of vehicular transportation and circumscribes the area a believer can 
travel on the Sabbath and holidays. Thus, for Orthodox Jews to ex-
ercise their religion, they must “be able to gather for worship in con-
gregations large enough to ensure the presence of a minyan, and 
close enough to the congregants’ homes to allow them to walk to 
services.”70 
These religious strictures made ordinary, free-standing houses of 
worship impractical for the Orthodox Jews in Ramapo. Ramapo’s 
zoning code allowed such structures only on plots of at least two 
acres. Building such a synagogue “would cost as much as $750,000, 
an expenditure that would require the support of approximately 150 
families,” many more than the small cluster of Orthodox families 
that had moved to Ramapo.71 Instead, Ramapo accommodated the 
Orthodox congregation with a favorable interpretation of its zoning 
provision for home professional offices (“HPOs”). The provision 
permits certain professionals, including clergy, to operate offices in 
the home. In the mid-1980s, Ramapo interpreted this HPO provi-
sion as permitting home synagogues (“shteebles”) that enabled rabbis 
 
 69. See Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 417-18. 
 70. Id. at 417 (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. at 417-18. 
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to conduct religious services in their homes for groups of up to 
forty-nine individuals.72 
b. The village’s exclusionary moves. However, certain residents of 
Ramapo’s Airmont section opposed this and other zoning accom-
modations that could encourage immigration of Orthodox Jews.73 
These residents formed the Airmont Civic Association, Inc. (“ACA”) 
which advocated the incorporation of the Airmont section into a vil-
lage that could adopt its own zoning code. The ACA vigorously op-
posed any further zoning accommodations, such as granting Rabbi 
Sternberg’s application to conduct worship services in his home. 
ACA members “posted themselves outside of Rabbi Sternberg’s 
home to count the arriving congregants; [one ACA leader] at other 
times parked in front of the homes of other Orthodox Jews during 
their prayer times.”74 The ACA’s campaign for incorporation under-
scored, as its primary purpose, the “desire to keep the Orthodox and 
Hasidic Jews out.”75 One statement promulgated by ACA leaders 
bristled at the prospect of cohabitating with “‘a bunch of people 
who insist on living in the past. I am not prejudice [sic] in any way, 
shape or form but i [sic] will not have a hasidic community in my 
backyard.’”76 The public vote for incorporation passed by a three-to-
one margin, and the Village of Airmont was formally incorporated in 
April 1991. A village trustee stated that now “there are other ways 
we can harass them.”77 Two days later, the plaintiffs filed suit. 
In January 1993, the Village of Airmont enacted its own zoning 
code, which rewrote Ramapo’s accommodating HPO provision. The 
Airmont version demanded that the HPO be only “incidental and 
secondary to the use . . . for dwelling” and “shall not generate activi-
ties that come into a residential area so as to detract from the resi-
dential character of the area.”78 The village reserved to itself the dis-
cretion of interpretation: “Any aggrieved person shall apply to the  
 
 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 74. Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 420. 
 75. Id. at 418. 
 76. Id. at 419. 
 77. Id. at 420. 
 78. Id. (quoting VILLAGE OF AIRMONT, N.Y., ZONING CODE, art. XVIII(2) (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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Zoning Board of Appeals for an interpretation as to whether or not a 
proposed activity or use” is a permissible HPO.79 
Though the Village of Airmont’s zoning code had not yet been 
applied against its Orthodox Jews (Rabbi Sternberg’s zoning ac-
commodation application was eventually granted), the Village of 
Airmont’s mayor and three of its four trustees opposed an interpreta-
tion of the HPO provision that allowed worship services in clergy 
homes. Evidence suggested the zoning concerns of the trustees and 
the ACA were “selective, focusing only on Orthodox [home] syna-
gogues” and their handful of pious pedestrians as sources of “traffic 
or noise.”80 During this same period, the village ignored the actual 
traffic and noise of a local country club, described by one witness as 
“‘a total nightmare.’”81 Similarly, it unanimously approved a variance 
to accommodate a too-tall Catholic spire, with one trustee advocat-
ing the approval “‘because this is the Catholic church [sic] that 
wants it.’”82 
2. History in the lower court 
Bringing suit in the Southern District of New York, Rabbi 
Sternberg spearheaded an action by several Orthodox Jews against 
the Village of Airmont and its leading officers, both individually and 
in their official capacity. The United States Attorney filed a parallel 
action (the two were later joined), similarly alleging that the defen-
dants’ acts violated the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause and the 
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).  At trial, the jury found for the individ-
ual defendants but found the village had violated the plaintiffs’ Free 
Exercise and FHA rights.83 However, the jury awarded no damages. 
The district judge set aside the jury’s verdict against the village, find-
ing it inconsistent with an award of no damages, and denied the 
plaintiffs any relief against the Village of Airmont.84 
 
 
 
 79. Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 421. 
 81. Id. (quoting from Trial Transcript at 5335). 
 82. Id. (quoting from Trial Transcript at 3025). 
 83. See id. at 422. 
 84. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 846 F.Supp. 294, 295 (1994).  
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3. The Second Circuit’s ruling 
On appeal, in 1995, the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court’s rulings regarding the FHA and Free Exercise claims against 
the village, reinstating the jury’s verdict.85 It remanded the case with 
an order for injunctive relief and nominal damages for the plaintiffs. 
The court affirmed the dismissal of the private plaintiffs’ claims 
against the individual defendants. 
The court rehearsed how the First Amendment, by incorporation 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, bars the states from prohibit-
ing the free exercise of religion.86 Referencing the fresh ruling in 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the court 
recognized that 
it is unclear to what extent this prohibition requires states affirma-
tively to accommodate religious practice . . . [but] it is firmly estab-
lished that “‘if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict 
practices because of their religious motivation, the law . . . is invalid 
unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored 
to advance that interest . . . .’ [A] law targeting religious beliefs as 
such is never permissible.”87 
Finding the jury’s verdict (that a desire to impede religious exer-
cise did motivate the ordinance) “fully supportable” by the evidence, 
the court reinstated the verdict and invalidated the ordinance.88 Be-
cause “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, even for minimal pe-
riods of time, constitutes irreparable injury,”89 the court noted that a 
victim can have standing before the actual injury occurs. The court 
explained that Free Exercise violations can also trigger causes of ac-
tion under federal civil rights law.90 Besides the Free Exercise claim, 
the Second Circuit elaborated on why the evidence supported the 
verdict that the village had violated the FHA.91 
 
 85. See Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 429. 
 86. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 87. Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 426 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)). 
 88. Id. at 429. 
 89. Id. at 426. 
 90. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1999). 
 91. Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent or otherwise 
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . religion.” 42 U.S.C.  
§ 3604(a) (1999). The FHA’s prohibitions extend to discriminatory zoning restrictions as an 
unlawful method of “otherwise mak[ing] unavailable” housing. NAACP v. Town of Hunting-
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B. Round Two: Comprehensive Injunctive Relief 
On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court ordered 
three forms of injunctive relief.  First, the court entered a prohibitory 
injunction enjoining the village from: (1) promoting religious dis-
crimination; (2) denying equal protection to religions by use, inter-
pretation, or enforcement of the zoning code; and (3) discriminating 
in housing based on religion, or interfering with the exercise of relig-
ion through housing. Second, the court entered a mandatory injunc-
tion requiring the village to revise its zoning code so that it could 
not be construed to prevent home worship, or to prevent persons 
from walking to and from places of religious worship. The court spe-
cifically called for an addition to [the Village of Airmont’s] zoning 
code entitled “Residential Place of Worship.” Such places were de-
fined as “areas located within a residence that is used for the con-
ducting of religious services.” The order provided that such places 
“will be permitted by right on any day in all residential zones.” 
Third, the court entered a mandatory injunction regarding notifica-
tion and the retention of documents. The village was ordered to 
keep all documents related to zoning decisions, and notify the gov-
ernment of any such decisions, or of any meetings of planning or 
zoning boards at which applications touching on religious worship 
would be presented.92 
In its appeal to the Second Circuit (Fletcher II), the Village of 
Airmont faulted the mandatory injunction for three reasons.93 It 
viewed the injunction as: (1) disproportionate because the violation 
 
ton, 844 F.2d 926, 938 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). Any aggrieved person has stand-
ing to sue, even if injury by a discriminatory housing practice is prospective, as long as the ag-
grieved believes that such injury is about to occur. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1999). Using a 
theory of disparate treatment, a plaintiff can establish an FHA violation by demonstrating that 
“animus against the protected group ‘was a significant factor in the position taken’ by the mu-
nicipal decision-makers . . . .” Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Yonkers Bd. 
of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1217, 1223, 1226 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 
(1988)). “Discriminatory intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances . . . .” 
Id. 
 92. See Fletcher II, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31800, at *4-5 (quoting LeBlanc-Sternberg 
v. Fletcher, 922 F. Supp. 959, 964-65 & n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 93. The village relied upon the criteria set forth in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 
(1977). The Supreme Court directed courts to consider three factors: (1) the remedy must be 
“determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation,” (2) the injunction must 
be remedial in nature, i.e. restore the victims to the position they would have occupied but for 
the discriminatory conduct, and (3) the remedy must respect the role of state and local au-
thorities in the management of their affairs. Id. at 280-81. 
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found by the court was merely predictive, and not existing; (2) not 
remedial; and (3) a judicial usurpation of the power of local govern-
ment to modify the zoning regulations. 
The Second Circuit rejected these three arguments. First, the 
court ruled that the village had already violated the plaintiffs’ rights 
by passing a zoning code based on religious animus. The village’s 
“egregious constitutional violation” called for a remedy that “cured 
the past constitutional violation and obviated the threat of future 
constitutional violations.”94 Second, the court reasoned that a pro-
spective order can also be remedial because such orders may be nec-
essary to ensure future compliance.95 The injunction on the village 
“ensured that rights to free exercise of religion were unencumbered, 
and the constant threat of limitation of those rights was lifted.”96 
Third, the court acknowledged that it had previously urged federal 
courts to defer initially to “a state’s ability to remedy constitutional 
deficiencies” itself.97 However, in this case, considering the village’s 
raison d’être and the finding that future violations were “likely,” the 
court found “no indication that the Village was going to make the 
changes necessary” to guarantee constitutional compliance.98 
C. Round Three: What “Winning” Means 
After receiving the injunctive relief affirmed by the Second Cir-
cuit, the private plaintiffs moved for an award of costs and attorneys’ 
fees against the village (Fletcher III). Surprisingly, the same district 
court judge who had granted the plaintiffs the three injunctions  
 
 
 94. Fletcher II, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31800 at *9 (emphasis added). 
 95. See id. at *11. 
 96. Id. at *12. 
 97. Id. (describing the holding in Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 213 (2d. Cir. 
1986)). 
 98. Id. at *12-13. The Second Circuit defended the extent of the relief generally by cit-
ing Supreme Court pronouncements that grant broad latitude in crafting an injunction. It is “a 
balancing process left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court.” United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987) (citing Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)). The remedy must “so far as 
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the 
future.” Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). In fact, the Supreme Court 
had already approved a previous ruling by the Second Circuit in which the court specifically 
ordered revisions to a municipality’s zoning code to secure its compliance with civil rights un-
der the Constitution. See NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff’d, 488 
U.S. 15 (1988). 
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found that the plaintiffs had not met the “prevailing party” standard, 
and thus denied the motion.99 
In Fletcher III in 1998, the Second Circuit ruled for the appeal-
ing plaintiffs, reversing and remanding the case for a calculation of 
their award.100 It reasoned that the established violations of plaintiffs’ 
rights and their injunctive relief satisfied the prevailing party stan-
dard. The court found that the district judge “seriously understated 
the significance of the injunction.”101 Though the Orthodox Jewish 
plaintiffs had not yet been prevented from worshiping in their 
homes, “the injunction removed a substantial threat of such interfer-
ence.”102 The district judge himself acknowledged that the changes 
ordered in the village’s zoning code “‘may be helpful to any new re-
ligious groups that desire to hold services in a private home in a resi-
dential area.’”103 In remanding for calculation, the court reminded 
the district judge that the purpose of this award is “‘to encourage the 
bringing of meritorious civil rights claims which might otherwise be 
abandoned because of the financial imperatives . . . .’”104 
D. Round Four? Prospective Prohibitions 
Since Fletcher III, the Second Circuit has made no further rul-
ings on the Airmont “home synagogue” controversy. But it may yet 
get another chance. The Orthodox Jews of Airmont Village have ap-
plied to build a very large home synagogue, “designed to accommo-
date hundreds of people on a regular basis.”105 The space inside the 
proposed 16,580 square-foot structure would be split between resi-
dential and “devotional” uses, making it “larger by far than all but a 
very few residential dwellings and also larger than many free-standing 
 
 99. The judge reasoned that the plaintiffs had failed against all defendants except the 
village and had not secured the “major relief” (damages) that they sought. Fletcher III, 143 
F.3d at 751 (reviewing the district court’s reasons). 
 100. See id. Subsequently, the district judge balked at this order and requested instead 
that the remanded case be transferred to another judge on the district court bench. See Mark 
Hamblett, Judge Balks at Order from 2d Circuit Panel; Calculation of Counsel Fees is Reas-
signed, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1998, at 1 col. 5. 
 101. Fletcher III, 143 F.3d at 759. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 760 (quoting the district court’s unpublished memorandum decision of Oc-
tober 15, 1996, denying attorneys’ fees). 
 104. Id. at 763 (quoting Kerr v. Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 105. Village of Airmont v. United States, No. 98-3801, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2376, at 
*1, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1999). 
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houses of worship.”106 Characterizing this application as an “unex-
pected development,” the village has expressed a desire to add re-
strictions to its zoning code to limit such structures.107 Last year, the 
district court declined to grant the village advance approval of con-
templated amendments to the village’s zoning code.108 The court in-
voked both a lack of jurisdiction (the United States—the defendant 
in the declaratory action—had not consented to be sued) and the 
general prohibition on advisory opinions, and thus dismissed the suit 
without reaching the merits.109 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Part assesses the Second Circuit’s reasoning regarding the 
Free Exercise claim in Fletcher I. It then analyzes the impact of the 
court’s three Fletcher holdings on this area of law. Lastly, it proposes 
several measures to reconcile the rights of religious exercise with the 
legitimate interests of local governmental administration. 
A. Assessing the Court’s Resolution 
The Second Circuit properly reinstated the verdict in Fletcher I 
that found violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause and the FHA. On the Free Exercise claim, the court safely re-
lied on the recent Lukumi precedent, which struck down an ordi-
nance motivated by religious animus that targeted the religious wor-
ship of a particular group.110 The consistency and unanimity of the 
Second Circuit’s decisions through this decade-long controversy 
sends a strong warning to those municipalities contemplating exclu-
sionary zoning ordinances. Though the composition of the three-
judge panel changed in each round of litigation, all three rulings fa-
vored the Orthodox Jewish plaintiffs and all three were unanimous 
decisions. 
The court did not elaborate, however, on the proper standard for 
determining impermissible religious animus. Specifically, it failed to 
explain how much animus constitutes a “significant factor” and 
which sources of animus are impermissible. Judging from the facts it 
 
 106. Id. at *3. 
 107. Id. at *4. 
 108. See id. at *1. 
 109. See id. at *7. 
 110. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520. 
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chose to highlight, the court gave serious weight to the defendants’ 
individual history, before they became village officials, of unabashed 
civic agitation against the Orthodox Jewish community. But it is un-
clear whether a public official’s prior activism and intent can always 
be imputed to his subsequent official acts that appear facially neutral. 
The Fletcher I court’s willingness to probe the factual record à la Lu-
kumi to ascertain motive suggests that the aggregation of these mo-
tives—even if they are expressed unofficially, as here—have signifi-
cant weight in the scales of decision. On the other hand, perhaps few 
cases will contain a record of animus as clear as Fletcher.111 Without 
such a convincing record of ill intent, courts will likely find intent to 
be “neutral” and burdens on religion “incidental,” and thus permis-
sible. 
B. Impact of the Court’s Decisions on the Law 
The results of the Fletcher decisions suggest a modest but signifi-
cant victory for advocates of religious liberty. It is modest because 
the holding may be limited to situations in which religious animus 
clearly motivates the challenged state action. It is significant because 
the Second Circuit reinforced two principles that aid churches with 
Free Exercise claims. First, it indicated that the right of Free Exercise 
contains a locational component, though courts have not traditionally 
so held.112 Second, the strong set of judicial remedies applied may 
enhance the ability of other religious organizations, especially home 
worshippers, to obtain redress. 
1. The right to Free Exercise: a locational component 
In recent decades, courts deciding religious land use cases have 
“ignore[d] the reality that property and religious exercise are inextri-
cably linked,”113 even though the “right to create [physical] worship 
space” is arguably a “core First Amendment right.”114 Zoning ordi-
nances are generally permitted to exclude a church “as long as an ‘al-
 
 111. See MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A 
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 251 (1996). 
 112. See CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 21. 
 113. Id. at 19. Property used for religious purposes “becomes an extension and embodi-
ment of religious exercise [and] [t]he relationship between property and religion is thus a close 
one. But many courts miss this link.” Carmella, supra note 42, at 584. 
 114. Laycock, supra note 40, at 758. 
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ternative location’ is legally possible” and the discrimination is not 
overt.115 Thus, worship in a particular location is typically not seen 
as inherent to religious freedom.116 For example, one group for 
whom particular sacred locations have always been integral to reli-
gious exercise is Native Americans. Yet they have suffered from a 
“pattern of lower-court rulings against free exercise claims by [Native 
Americans] relating to government land use,”117 capped by the Su-
preme Court’s major adverse ruling in Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association.118 
In Fletcher, however, the Second Circuit connected the location 
of worship with the right of Free Exercise. To give meaning to the 
Orthodox Jews’ right to worship in Airmont, the injunction located 
that right in a rabbi’s home. This sets a useful precedent for religious 
organizations whose religious exercise relates closely to location. 
Perhaps few groups share the quorum and transportation mandates 
of Orthodox Jewry. But the link between favorable locations and the 
vibrancy of religious activity conceivably affects many churches for 
whom frequent congregating and close community living are an ex-
ercise of faith. 
This precedent, that religious exercise has a locational compo-
nent, may improve the geographic mobility of believers from one 
neighborhood to another. In the instant case, it will likely undo the 
ACA’s chilling effect on Jewish immigration from the village’s hostil-
ity.119 Now the religious rights of prospective residents of Airmont 
seem far more secure. This reassurance matters immensely to close-
knit minority religions, because “in the absence of a willingness on 
the pa[rt] of local communities to accommodate the needs of Or-
thodox Jews for local houses of worship, [an Orthodox] community 
will be effectively locked out of many neighborhoods across this 
 
 115. CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 20. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Lupu, supra note 63, at 946 n.56. 
 118. 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that burdens on Free Exercise imposed by logging 
activities in particular areas sacred to Native Americans do not require compelling governmen-
tal interest, because they only inhibit religious practices rather than coerce individuals into act-
ing contrary to their beliefs). See also Ammoneta Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that constructing a dam that would flood certain sites and 
cemeteries sacred to Native Americans was not a constitutionally cognizable infringement on 
Free Exercise). 
 119. See LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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great land.”120 Recent decades have generated a pattern of “ostensi-
bly neutral land use laws” that burden the Jewish religion “by not 
allowing Jews to worship within close proximity to where they 
live.”121 Thus, the court’s change of the Village of Airmont’s code 
has sent ripples across a debate with far-reaching demographic rami-
fications.122 
Orthodox Judaism’s demanding standards render it particularly 
vulnerable to hostility in suburbs such as the Village of Airmont. But 
other religious groups similarly suffer from exclusionary neighbors. 
“Towns have overwhelmingly used zoning laws to prevent minority 
denominations from locating in their communities.”123 As Airmont’s 
Orthodox Jews have learned, these exclusionary impulses are com-
pounded if membership in a given church also connotes an ethnic 
identity. For example, the zoning authorities of Wayne, New Jersey, 
denied a permit to a black church because of one town official’s vo-
cal opposition, fearing a racial transformation of the neighbor-
hood.124 Officials in Clifton, New Jersey, denied permits to a “black” 
mosque four times, citing parking problems; but later, they approved 
a “white” church nearby that presented identical parking concerns.125 
Similarly, zoning officials manipulated parking rules to effectively ex-
clude any mosque from a Mississippi community in Islamic Center v. 
City of Starkville.126 
The Second Circuit’s invalidation of the Airmont Village ordi-
nance in Fletcher I runs counter to the trend in federal jurisprudence. 
Courts typically defer to a municipality’s restrictions on church loca-
tions, as long as the restrictions fall short of outright prohibition and 
an alternative location for the church theoretically exists, even if the 
 
 120. Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 2148 Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, June 23, 1998 (statement of David Zwiebel, general counsel for Agudath Is-
rael of America, the nation’s largest grassroots Orthodox Jewish organization) available in 
LEXIS, Federal News Service File [hereinafter Zwiebel Statement]. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Brief of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as amicus curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents at app., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074) 
[hereinafter LDS Church Amicus Brief]. The brief’s appended statistical survey reveals that 
smaller churches must fight much harder than mainline churches to secure accommodation 
under zoning codes. 
 123. Rebecca Beynon, Regulation of Church Land Use and Discrimination Against Mi-
nority Faiths 46 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 124. See Laycock, supra note 40, at 781. 
 125. See id. 
 126. 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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alternative is impractical or financially prohibitive.127 But because the 
Fletcher case contained an unusually clear intent to discriminate,128 
the Second Circuit’s holding alone may not reverse that trend, and 
may be limited to cases with similarly compelling facts. 
2. Enhanced remedies: extensive injunctions and attorneys’ fees 
In Fletcher II and Fletcher III, the Second Circuit employed two 
powerful remedies in granting relief to the plaintiffs. This precedent 
may enhance the ability of future Free Exercise claimants to obtain 
relief. The court both narrowed the Village of Airmont’s zoning dis-
cretion and relieved the plaintiffs of the onerous burden of attorneys’ 
fees and costs. 
a. Injunctive relief. The set of injunctions upheld in Fletcher II 
sharply curtailed the village’s discretion in zoning decisions affecting 
religious exercise. Previously, the sword of Damocles dangled above 
the home worship meetings, hanging by the thread of village discre-
tion. The court responded vigorously. The specificity of the injunc-
tive relief should encourage advocates of religious liberty. Even 
though zoning is traditionally a local function, this federal court 
found that extensive intervention was justified. Even before Airmont 
Village abused its discretion, the injunctions rewrote portions of the 
zoning code, mandated that the zoning authorities construe certain 
provisions as permitting home worship, and put the board under ju-
dicial surveillance. 
This remedy pinpoints the true danger for religious minorities in 
land use disputes: the wide (and easily abused) discretion that mu-
nicipal zoning authorities enjoy, both in how rules are made and in 
how they are applied. A typical zoning board’s level of discretion al-
lows judgments that are so subjective that “[i]n the free speech con-
text, we would call this standardless licensing, and it would be un-
constitutional.”129 Land use regulation “is administered through 
highly discretionary and individualized processes that leave ample 
room for deliberate but hidden discrimination, and where there is 
substantial evidence of widespread hostility to non-mainstream 
churches and some hostility to all churches.”130 Moreover, if zoning 
 
 127. See CARMELLA, supra note 37, at 20. 
 128. See Beynon, supra note 123, at 21. 
 129. Laycock 1999 Senate Statement, supra note 29. 
 130. Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Senate 
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boards, which are naturally sensitive to majoritarian pressures, reject 
the minority church’s request, the church may have no effective re-
course.131 
In Smith, the Supreme Court worried that conditioning “an in-
dividual’s obligation to obey [a generally applicable] law” upon the 
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs allows the belief-
motivated individual “‘to become a law unto himself.’”132 A society 
of laws could simply not tolerate this result. But permitting the mul-
titude of local zoning boards to reach decisions—without objective 
justification or effective oversight—permits them to become a law 
unto themselves. 
The epilogue to the Second Circuit’s three rulings hints at the 
risks of aggressive injunctive intervention. It may handcuff local offi-
cials. The court’s remedy was so protective of home worship that the 
Orthodox Jews planned an enormous home-synagogue. Since the 
district court refused to approve in advance the village’s contem-
plated restrictions, the village acts at its peril. If it wishes to enact 
even a reasonable measure limiting an Orthodox super synagogue, 
the village apparently must bear the full risk of judicial penalty if the 
court later finds the measure discriminatory. How many municipali-
ties could afford that risk? How many well-intentioned and needful 
decisions will a municipality forego for fear of being misunderstood 
by a court? 
On the other hand, a huge home synagogue seems a natural con-
sequence of the village’s hostility. Remembering the village’s past in-
timidation, the Orthodox Jews may reasonably expect the village to 
deny site approval for a free-standing synagogue. Meanwhile, this 
planned home synagogue capitalizes on the one thing the Orthodox 
now know they can do in Airmont—worship in their homes. Why 
not build what they can before the village bureaucracy regains the 
upper hand? Moreover, given the practical difficulties of the residen-
tial real estate market, the hope of “locat[ing] a church in built-up  
 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 1, 1997 (statement by Douglas Laycock, Professor, University of 
Texas Law School) available in LEXIS, Federal News Service File. 
 131. In some state zoning acts, there are no provisions for judicial review of decisions by 
local government bodies that administer zoning ordinances. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, 
LAND USE LAW § 8.11, at 326 (2d ed. 1988). 
 132. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 
(1878)). 
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residential neighborhoods is illusory for all but . . . congregations 
[that] can meet in a single house.”133 
b. Award of attorneys’ fees. The award of attorneys’ fees and costs 
in Fletcher III demonstrated the court’s proper understanding of 
what home-worship plaintiffs are really seeking. The court’s interpre-
tation of prevailing party recognized that the liberty interests re-
deemed by injunction far outweigh the failed claims for damages. 
Evidently, the court shared the view of Rabbi Sternberg’s attorney 
that “the case ‘was about the right to pray and not about 
money.’”134 Like Rabbi Sternberg, plaintiffs who care more about 
freedom than damages—which is highly probable in lawsuits about 
religious exercise—are now more likely to be classified as prevailing 
parties and thus deserving of attorneys’ fees if they secure at least in-
junctive relief. 
The legal representation that rallied to the cause of the Orthodox 
Jews in the Village of Airmont indicates that they had powerful 
friends.135 This court’s standard for awarding attorneys’ fees bodes 
well for churches with less powerful allies. It particularly favors small, 
minority churches in a crucial and practical way. A formidable study 
shows why they need this help.136 It is smaller churches that are more 
often the subject of discriminatory zoning practices. Though minor-
ity churches represent only nine percent of the population, they are 
embroiled in half the lawsuits involving zoning and churches.137 
Once in court, interestingly, their rates of success approximate those 
of larger churches.138 Even larger churches seem “more vulnerable 
than other projects of similar size to NIMBY139 opposition” because 
“any one church may have only a few potential members in the im-
mediate neighborhood,”140 with the rest of its congregation spread 
out in various municipalities. 
 
 133. Laycock, supra note 40, at 761. 
 134. Hamblett, supra note 100, at 1 col. 5 (quoting Manhattan attorney Alan J. Straus). 
 135. The Attorney General of the State of New York, the Anti-Defamation League of 
B’nai B’rith, Agudath Israel of America, and the Rutherford Institute each filed an amicus cu-
riae brief for the Orthodox and Government plaintiffs. See Fletcher I, 67 F.3d at 412. 
 136. See supra note 122. 
 137. See LDS Church Amicus Brief,  supra note 122, at A-5. 
 138. See id. at A-7. 
 139. In public policy parlance, an acronym for a community’s opposition to a proposed 
project: “not in my backyard.” 
 140. Laycock, supra note 40, at 759 (explaining why virtually any church’s members find 
themselves in a distinct minority in their municipality). 
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Even these startling statistics understate the problem. The ex-
pense of litigation often prevents many churches from filing suit. 
Most small churches “bend over backwards to avoid conflicts with 
future neighbors and city officials they must deal with on a continu-
ing basis[,] . . . giv[ing] up on claims they may believe are valid in 
the interest of social peace.”141 It is not known how many incidents 
of discrimination go legally unchallenged because smaller churches 
cannot fund a fight. The prevailing party standard in Fletcher III 
would empower smaller churches with a promising equitable claim 
to seek redress in the courts. A readiness by courts to award attor-
neys’ fees to a successful claimant would avoid the dilemma churches 
often face: suffering unconstitutional restraints or delving into the 
collection basket to fund uncertain litigation. 
C. Recommendations for Moderate Protections 
The recommendations below aim to enhance the protection of 
Free Exercise rights while fairly esteeming the interests of local gov-
ernments in land use planning. They seek to improve the legislation 
and the standards which courts apply to resolve religious land use 
cases. 
1. Narrow the discretion of zoning boards 
a. Shift the burden of justification back onto governmental bodies. 
The level of discretion enjoyed by zoning boards varies widely 
among and within jurisdictions, and broad discretion threatens reli-
gious liberty. The law should protect religious exercise against sub-
stantial burdens by shifting the responsibility of justifying such bur-
dens to the zoning boards. 
How heavy should this burden of justification be? The RLPA bill 
retains the strict-scrutiny standard for governmental action that 
“substantially burden[s]” religious exercise.142 But the burden of jus-
tification need not be that heavy to be effective; it need only place 
some responsibility on municipalities to effect a profound increase in 
Free Exercise protection. For example, the law could establish a “re-
 
 141. The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on House Bill 4019/1308 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 134 (1998) 
(statement by W. Cole Durham, Jr., Professor, Brigham Young University Law School) [here-
inafter Durham Statement]. 
 142. See 105 H.R. 4019, § 2(b) (1998). 
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buttable presumption” that governmental burdens (direct or inci-
dental143) on religious exercise are invalid, or it could subject a mu-
nicipality’s reasons for an ordinance to greater—perhaps “height-
ened”—scrutiny, requiring a showing that the regulation “advance[] 
an important . . . governmental purpose.”144 Either approach would 
alter the balance by removing governmental bureaucracy’s chief ad-
vantages: inertia and indifference. If the burden of justification rests 
with that bureaucracy, then neither bureaucratic inertia nor indiffer-
ence could crush a religious exercise claimant. 
A heightened scrutiny standard, located somewhere between ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny, may be difficult to calibrate precisely, 
but it is workable.145 For example, RLPA’s land use provision re-
quires the government to justify any regulation that “substantially 
burdens” religious exercise with a showing of “substantial and tangi-
ble harm” to the community. A heightened standard would be most 
effective at the extremes, validating significant governmental reasons 
and exposing pretextual ones, like the Village of Airmont’s reasoning 
that Orthodox Jews—doctrinally bound to walk reverently to ser-
vices—are a source of traffic and noise. Thus courts could balance in-
terests, but with a modest burden of persuasion on the municipality. 
Shifting the burden of justification away from churches and onto 
a municipal bureaucracy (with its potentially large public resources) 
will cause even well-intentioned zoning boards to weigh more cau-
tiously, and tailor more closely, proposals that may burden religious 
exercise. The frequent “approximation and imprecision” of zoning 
regulations “may interfere with religious exercise without furthering 
any municipal interest.”146 Shifting the presumption will yield Parato 
optimality,147 where otherwise zoning boards could remain insulated 
 
 143. See Dorf, supra note 64, at 1199 (contending that the law should recognize certain 
incidental burdens as “infringements of constitutional rights” and therefore subject to some 
form of heightened scrutiny). 
 144. Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 139 (emphasis added). 
 145. See Dorf, supra note 64, at 1199-1200 (discussing various models for approaching 
incidental burdens and concluding the “best options” apply some form of heightened or strict 
scrutiny to certain incidental burdens). 
 146. Carmella, supra note 42, at 575. 
 147. In economic theory, Parato optimality is an arrangement by which each side has 
moved to a point where any further increase in utility for one party will necessarily decrease the 
other’s utility. The theory is best understood in terms of indifference curves. It recognizes that, 
if parties have differing values, after party X achieves a certain level of utility, party Y may still 
increase its utility by shifts to which party X is indifferent, until the shifting reaches the point of 
Parato optimality. For purposes of this discussion, a church’s religious goals presumably differ 
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and indifferent to the incidental or unintended consequences of their 
regulations. 
b. Courts should probe for threats to religious exercise. Courts 
should probe for discriminatory intent, rather than deferring to mu-
nicipal decisions, whenever intentional threats to fundamental rights 
such as Free Exercise are suspected from the record. Admittedly, dis-
cerning motive may prove too difficult at times, as “courts are often 
reluctant to attribute the collective decision” to the expressed dis-
criminatory motive of individual policy-makers.148 As the historic de-
fender of the out-voted minority, courts have an affirmative duty to 
protect fundamental liberties, despite Smith’s apparent abdication of 
such responsibility for Free Exercise. Otherwise, the noble guaran-
tees of liberty in law will fade into the majority’s discretionary prefer-
ences and prejudices. “Of our public decision-making practices, only 
adjudication imposes obligations to decide and give public reasons 
for the decision,”149 which makes courts—and their ability to require 
governmental bodies to give public reasons—indispensable to the 
protection of religious exercise. 
As it minimized the judiciary’s role regarding Free Exercise, the 
majority in Smith admitted that “leaving accommodation to the po-
litical process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious 
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that [is an] unavoidable 
consequence of democratic government.”150 In subsequent testi-
mony before Congress, an expert responded that “[f]rankly, that had 
not been our understanding. We had always thought that the free-
doms enumerated in the Bill of Rights were designed to protect the 
vulnerable minority from the tyrannical majority.”151 Vulnerable to 
the discretion of zoning boards, religious minorities need the af-
firmative protection of a court that can request that municipalities 
publicly justify the burdens they impose. 
 
 
from a municipality’s goals (e.g., health and safety). Often, a town can maintain its desired 
level of health and safety and still allow a church certain shifts that increase its religious exer-
cise. This shifting, however, requires municipal sensitivity; a town unaccountable for the inci-
dental burdens it imposes will lack incentives to accommodate a church. 
 148. Laycock 1999 Senate Statement, supra note 29. 
 149. Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 593 (1998). 
See id. (assessing reasons for judicial hesitancy regarding religious exemptions). 
 150. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 151. Zwiebel Statement, supra note 120. 
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c. Legislatures should compile a record of zoning discrimination 
against religious exercise. Though the Supreme Court in Boerne in-
validated RFRA as overreaching, none of the Court’s precedents 
suggest “that there is anything improper about the congressional ob-
jective of protecting religious freedom beyond the constitutional 
minimum.”152 In Boerne, the Court agreed that Congress may regu-
late government practices which “have a significant likelihood of be-
ing unconstitutional.”153 The high risk of purposeful discrimination 
in zoning decisions arguably makes these “government practices” a 
deserving target of legislation. For example, Congress could 
heighten scrutiny by declaring “presumptively unlawful all govern-
mental practices in these areas [including land use] that can be 
proven in litigation to have a substantially discriminatory effect on 
religion.”154 
At minimum, legislative attempts to protect religious freedom 
must, like RLPA, learn the lessons of Boerne. They must respect the 
Supreme Court’s historical prerogative of constitutional interpreta-
tion; invoke firm constitutional authority; and compile a more com-
prehensive record of the Free Exercise violations that necessitate leg-
islative redress. Such legislation must also respect federalism’s 
restraints. RLPA, for instance, has been promoted as “not a bill to 
regulate the states; it is a bill to deregulate religion.”155 Federal over-
protection of religious exercise would prove counterproductive, even 
for religious interests. Religious “excesses” far greater than a 16,580 
square-foot home synagogue could proliferate, beyond the reach of a 
municipality’s sensible regulation. If legislation narrows municipal 
zoning discretion too much, it increases the incentives for munici-
palities to fight harder to exclude churches entirely at the outset, 
fearful that once new churches become entrenched, they would be 
immune from local control.156 
2. Judges and litigants should avoid the hybrid rights approach 
Governmental action that abridges Free Exercise often tears at a 
web of rights—equal protection, due process, free speech, or free as-
 
 152. McConnell Statement, supra note 28. 
 153. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512. 
 154. Conkle, supra note 24, at 650. 
 155. Laycock 1999 Senate Statement, supra note 29. 
 156. See Pearlman & Meck, supra note 11, at 135. 
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sembly.157 While noting the other fundamental rights implicated in a 
given Free Exercise claim may illuminate the issues, judges and liti-
gants should avoid the “hybrid rights” characterization offered in 
Smith, which reasoned that burdens on Free Exercise do warrant 
strict scrutiny if they infringe on at least one other fundamental 
right. 
Indeed, the right of Free Exercise will often be bound up with 
other rights. In Fletcher I, the ordinance violated individual rights on 
two independent grounds: Free Exercise, and equal protection rights 
under FHA. In a land use case in the Tenth Circuit, a dissenting 
judge expounded on this strong connection among fundamental 
rights in the religion context.158 Places of worship should enjoy pro-
tection under the First Amendment “not only because housed wor-
ship has been historically central to religion but also because such ac-
tivities necessarily involve speech and assembly.”159 Because a house 
of worship is usually the only place of religious assembly and the cen-
tral place for the expression of religious speech, courts should scruti-
nize ordinances inhibiting houses of worship as strictly as speech and 
assembly ordinances. 
But lumping Free Exercise in with other fundamental rights 
poses an insidious threat to religious exercise. Lamentably, Smith’s 
hybrid rights approach yields ironic incentives for Free Exercise 
claimants. It lures the Free Exercise plaintiff to attempt to trigger 
strict scrutiny by adding related fundamental rights to create a multi-
pillared hybrid claim. This capitulates to Smith’s characterization of 
Free Exercise as a dependent right, incapable of triggering strict scru-
tiny on its own. This conceptualization of Free Exercise as an inferior 
right will degrade religious liberty. Upholding religious freedom by 
reliance on clauses other than Free Exercise will distort the law. The 
Founders wrote no second tier into the First Amendment for not-so-
fundamental rights. For those claims that happen to implicate no 
other fundamental right, Free Exercise should stand alone as defense 
enough. 
The danger that Free Exercise will degrade into a dependent 
right is real. One prominent view among scholars characterizes 
 
 157. See Wehener, supra note 34, at 511. 
 158. See Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820, 831 (10th Cir. 
1988) (McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989). 
 159. Id. 
JSMI-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  10:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1182 
church-state jurisprudence as the product of competition between an 
equality paradigm and a liberty paradigm.160 “Equality rights gener-
ally prevent government from imposing a burden on one person 
unless it imposes the burden on everyone. Liberty rights generally 
prevent the state from imposing the burden at all, even if it imposes 
it on everyone.”161  The central, foreboding feature of the post-Smith 
era seems to be that the “significance of religious freedom is being 
eroded by the ascendancy of the equality paradigm over the liberty 
paradigm in legal thought.”162 Rather than adopt a robust, liberty-
oriented conception of Free Exercise, “[c]ourts seem especially un-
comfortable with claims of religious exemption” for reasons inherent 
to religion.163 
The courts should not interpret Free Exercise as anything less 
than it was meant to be, as Justice O’Connor argues in her dissent in 
Boerne.  She warns that 
the Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination princi-
ple that protects only against those laws that single out religious 
practice for unfavorable treatment . . . . Rather, the Clause is best 
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in 
religious practices and conduct without impermissible governmen-
tal interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, 
generally applicable law.164 
This perspective properly interprets Free Exercise as an essential 
element of liberty, not a principle of equality. The equality standard 
is simply inappropriate because nothing is quite like religion. It has 
merited special protection since the Pilgrims. 
Whatever one ultimately thinks about the balance of liberty and 
equality, it is fair to say that the greatness of our tradition in reli-
gious liberty will be impoverished if we do not understand that at 
its core it is about the protection of religious differences, religious 
pluralism, and religious conscience, and that sometimes the values  
 
 
 
 160. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope of Free Exercise Protection, 32 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 670-76 (1999); see generally Carmella, supra note 42. 
 161. Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Re-
ligious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 568 (1998). 
 162. Durham, supra note 160, at 670. 
 163. Lupu, supra note 149, at 593; see generally Gedicks, supra note 161. 
 164. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 546 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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are so strong that they even override otherwise relevant equality 
claims.165 
Churches play a role in society unlike their fellow plaintiffs in land 
use disputes: shopping malls, liquor stores, and adult dance clubs. 
Their unquantifiable but unmistakable social value deserves special 
weight in the scales of justice and the corridors of policy. This is ever 
more urgent as municipalities face mounting obstacles to protecting 
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their resi-
dents. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fundamental questions of the Free Exercise debate focus on 
the proper scope of religious exercise and how to balance it against 
contrary governmental interests. In the land use context, the courts 
have adopted divergent approaches in analyzing how much the Con-
stitution protects religious exercise from burdens imposed by zoning 
ordinances. The Second Circuit’s decisions in LeBlanc-Sternberg v. 
Fletcher presented a modest but significant victory for religious exer-
cise. The court demonstrated that location is an integral aspect of re-
ligious exercise. Its comprehensive injunctive remedy suggested a 
greater affirmative duty on the court to protect religion. As one of 
only three federal circuit rulings on home worship, this precedent 
should assist other small religious groups seeking to defend this 
right. The award of attorneys’ fees for winning injunctive relief may 
embolden smaller religious groups to demand constitutional protec-
tion in court. 
This legal controversy bears enormous importance beyond the 
courtroom. It influences how we build and manage and belong to 
our own communities in America. It relates to an individual’s rights 
within his home and neighborhood. It asks whether the law can ef-
fectively protect those individuals whom a community wishes to ex-
clude because of their faith. In short, it affects how we treat those 
who are our neighbors. 
Religious freedom has no secular analogue. Its significance to 
liberty warrants special protection.  For persons of faith, religious lib-
erty is of unique importance—for many, of ultimate importance—
and thus “important enough to die for, to suffer for, to rebel for, to 
 
 165. Durham Statement, supra note 141, at 134. 
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emigrate for, to fight to control the government for.”166 It cannot be 
understood merely through association with other fundamental 
rights. It requires the affirmative protection of legislatures and courts 
against the discretion of zoning authorities. 
The Founders listed religious liberty as the first freedom of the 
Republic. The right to worship freely in homes and in public loca-
tions is an article of faith in America. The positive social value of reli-
gious organizations deserves the law’s reconsideration. As munici-
palities increasingly struggle to protect the health, safety, and morals 
of their residents, courts, and legislatures would do well to consider 
whether vibrant religious communities and favorably-located 
churches are not powerful and natural allies to these salutary public 
interests. 
John M. Smith 
 
 166. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
313, 317 (1996). 
